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IN THE SUPREHE COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,
a municipal corporation of
the State of Utah,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

Case No. 14659

vs.
UTAH WOOL PULLING COMPANY,
Defendant-Respondent.

APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING

TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND JUSTICES
COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH:

THE SUPREME

Appellant, Salt Lake City Corporation, respectfully
petitions the Court for

a

rehearing on its opinion filed in

the above-entitled cause on July 5, 1977.

The grounds for this

petition and the points wherein the Appellant alleges this
Court has erred are the following:
1.

The controlling opinion erroneously states that

plaintiff contends the value of the defendant's water rights
was the value of the defendant's diversionary facilities.
2.

The controlling opinion erred in allowing the valua-

tion of the water rights as part of the property which already
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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for.
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3.

The controlling opinion erred in assuming that plain-

tiff condemned the water rights and received them.
4.

The controlling opinion ignores the difference between

situations where water rights are valuable and third parties cannot obtain them or similar ones for the reason that they are not
sold or cannot be obtained by application, and where the right
is so readily available by purchase or application, that no one
will buy.
5.

The controlling opinion erred in upholding and accepting

comparables which were not similar in character, location and
other factors.

ARGUMENT
POINT

I

THE CONTROLLING OPINION ERRONEOUSLY STATES THAT PLAINTIFF CONTENDS
THE VALUE OF THE DEFENDANT'S WATER RIGHTS i'JAS THE VALUE OF THE
DEFENDANT'S DIVERSIONARY FACILITIES.
The controlling opinion is based in part on the statement
that the plaintiff contended the value of the defendant's water
rights was the value of
This is not correct.

the defendant's diversionary facility.

The plaintiff contends that the defendant's

water rights alone had a value which was determinable separate
and apart from all other facilities for diversion and use, all
of which had been previously paid for by the plaintiff.
It is well settled that a certified water right, riparian
or otherwise, is separable from the land and can be separately
conveyed and considered.
as

78 Am Jur 2d, \'Vaters, Section 242, states
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As a general proposi~ion, subject to statutory
or contractual restr1ct1ons, all rights to water
riparian or otherwise, may be severed from the
'
lands to which t~ey are attached, and separately
conveyed ... The r1ght to sell a water right free
from the land for which it was appropriated is
not cut_off by statutes requiring an intending
appropr1ator to apply to state officers for a
permit and to describe accurately the land on
which the water is to be used.
The sale of a water right separately from the land
to which it was first applied is not a sale of
the water, but a right to use water. (emphasis
added)
It has been the contention of plaintiff throughout this
case that the defendant's water right, by stipulation of the
parties, was to be valued separately and that the value of the
right should not be confused with the
the use to which it had been put prior,
allowed to occur in this case.

sale of the water or
as

the lower court

The value of the

water right

itself, standing alone, was what was to be valued separate
and apart from everything else.

The Court's failure to consider

the valuat.ion of the water right in this light was error.

POINT II
THE CONTROLLING OPINION ERRED IN ALLOWING THE VALUATION OF
THE WATER RIGHTS AS PART OF THE PROPERTY WHICH ALREADY HAD
BEEN PAID FOR.
In this case, the parties stipulated that the value of
the water rights should be considered separate and apart from
the value of the other property condemned; the value the water
rights would have by themselves in a sale to a willing third
party buyer.

However, the defendant changed its position at

trial contending that the water right had to be valued with its
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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alleged special use in connection with the property previously
paid for, contrary to the parties' stipulation dated t!ay 8, 1973,
and states in Article 7 (R

31-32) as follows:

7.
In this action the defendant has made
claim that the water rights from which well water
was secured for use on the condemned properties had
a market value at the time of the taking which would
be reflected in the market value of the total properties, as a unit, so as to result in a total fair market
value in excess of the aforesaid sum of $634,694.00;
but plaintiff denies that such water right had value
as contended by defendant.
The value of such rights,
if any, has been excluded from this stipulation.
Should defendant contend, after any further
meetings with plaintiff and/or additional research
and investl0ation, that said water rights did have
value at th~ time of the taking, and should plaintiff
continue to contend that such rights had no value, or
if the parties cannot otherwise resolve the issue,
defendant may request that the matter of the value of
such water rights, if any, be set for trial for rulings
on such legal and factual issues as shall be pertinent
to the matter, including such values, if any, for which
defendant may be entitled to receive additional compensation in this action.
By this stipulation, the defendant agreed that the value
of the water rights should be determined separate and apart from
the properties that had already been paid for.

Pursuant to this

stipulation, the water rights, that is the right to remove water
from under ground - not the use to which it had been placed - was
the value to be determined.
These water rights had a determinable value and
was zero.

that value

As testified by Mr. C. Francis Solomon, Jr., M.A.I.,

and uncontested by defendant, a willing buyer could have obtained
his own water rights for the same quantity and quality

of water

merely by applying for such rights to the State Engineer and
drilling a well.

According to the well drillers Mr. Solomon con-
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tacted, which testimony was also uncontested, for $8,000
a single new eight inch well could be drilled and water obtained
of like quality and quantity within a nile west, anywhere east,
at least one mile north, and anywhere south of where the defendant's wells were located.

\vhy then would a willing buyer pay

anything solely for the defendant's right to remove water from
underground.

The City had already paid for the wells and diversion

facilities and there was no value in the defendant's vTater rights.
Mr. Jay Bingham, a local and well respected water engineer,
testified that he had been employeed by A. K. Properties prior
to the trial and that under his supervision a sixteen inch well
was drilled on A. K. 's property approximately one mile northwest
of the defendant's property.

The well was drilled to a level

of 600 feet; however, Mr. Bingham testified

th~t

water down to

the 300 foot level was of the same quality cr 02tter as that
produced by the defendant's wells.

He stated further that such

water could have been produced in much greater quantities than
that produced by the wells of defendant, proving that the water
produced by defendant's wells was not unique and that it could
have been obtained in the same area by others merely through
applying to the State Engineer and drilling their own well.

He

too testified that defendant's water rights had no value for these
reasons.

(R 308-310).

Mr. Dee C. Hansen, State Engineer, Division of Water
Rights for the State of Utah, stated in the lower court case
that defendant's water rights had no value because the area where
the wr,lls were located was open to application for and drilling
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of wells to obtain water under the sam2 type or water rights as
those owned by defendant-respondent mereby by drilling a well
(R 319-321).

He also stated that there was no charge for the

water used under such water rights

(R 323).

He stated further

that water rights such as those held by defendant-respondent would
have great value in aquifer basins where all surface rights and
drilling rights were closed ($ 332).
The testimony of these three witnesses has been completely
ignored.
POINT III
THE CONTROLLING OPINION ERRED IN ASSUt1ING THAT PLAINTIFF CONDEMNED THE WATER RIGHTS AND RECEIVED THEM.
Plaintiff, Salt Lake City Corporation, did not condemn
the water right and in fact offered before and during trial
(however the defendant refused for good reason) to allow defendants to sell the water rights on the open market.

The reason

for the refusal was that they knew full well the water rights
had no value and that they could not be sold to anyone in this
aquifer basin and that the rights could not be transferred to
another aquifer basin.

Instead, they produced testimony to the

effect that water rights located in other basins, where the
State Engineer, Dee Hansen, has prohibited issuance of further
drilling water rights and all of the surface water rights had
been appropriated, had a value which was then assigned to the
defendant's water rights in the Salt Lake City aquifer basin.
Such water rights have no value in the Salt Lake City aquifer
basin for the reason that they arc so readily attainable by anySponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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one applying to the State Engineer and drilling for the water
in this basin.

The three aquifer basins referred to by the

plaintiff in Heber, Corrinne, and Weber County are all closed
to drilling and the surface water rights have been totally
appropriated.

Therefore, the sales used by the defendants in

showing the value

of water rights in those basins are inappro-

priate and inapplicable in the Salt Lake City basin and it was
a travesty of justice and error to allow such

into evidence.

The plaintiff should not be forced to pay for something it
did not get and cannot use.

The certified water rights of the

defendant have not been conveyed to the plaintiff nor
sought in the complaint nor asked for in the action.

were they
The City

should not be obliged to pay for something it did not want or
receive.
POINT IV
THE CONTROLLING OPINION IGNORES THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SITUATIONS
WHERE WATER RIGHTS ARE VALUABLE AND THIRD PARTIES CANNOT OBTAIN
THE/1 OR SIMILAR ONES FOR THE REASON THAT THEY ARE NOT SOLD OR
CANNOT BE OBTAINED BY APPLICATION, AND WHERE THE RIGHT IS SO
READILY AVAILABLE BY PURCHASE OR APPLICATION, THAT NO ONE WILL
BUY.
As cited in Southern Pacific Co. vs. Arthur, 10 Utah
2d 306, 352 P2d 693 (1960), the test for just compensation is
as follows:
... The standard of what is 'just compensation' in
the ordinary case is market value of the property
taken, that is what a willing buyer would pay
to a willing seller ....
The question is, would any willing buyer pay money for
something that is worthless?
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The plaintiff-appellant would be the first to

con~2de

that if the defendant's property and water rights had been
located in Heber, Corrinne, or Weber County, in the areas where
defendant obtained its comparables, the water rights would have
a high value, probably at or near the value affixed by the
defendant's appraiser, Memory Cain.

However, the Heber, Corrinne

and Weber water rights could not be transferred to any other
aquifer basin and neither could the defendant's water rights be
transferred to another aquifer basin.

The aquifer basin in

which the defendant's water rights are located was and is open
to drilling to anyone filing an application with the State
Engineer.

For these reasons, Dee Hansen, the State's Water

Engineer (R 319), Jay Bingham, a state water expert and engineer
(R 288), and Francis Solomon, M.A.I., the City's expert real
estate appraiser (R 246, 251) all testified that the defendant's
water rights had no value.
The Defendant stipulated that it could not sell these
water rights to anyone in the Salt Lake City aquifer basin for
the same reasons (R 177).

The court erred in ignoring the fore-

going facts.
Kennecott Copper Corporation vs. Salt Lake County, 122
Utah 431, 250 P?d 1938 (1952), cited and relied upon in the
controlling opinion, applies only to the situation where property did not have value for one purpose, but did for another.
Both Kennecott and the Sigurd

v. State case (142 P2d 154)

cited in the controlling opinion, addressed the situation where
there was no market value because there had been no sales, but
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the reason there had been no sales was a high value of the
property and no one wanted to part with it.

Whereas the

reason there were no sales of water rights in the area where
defendant's water rights were located was because similar rights
could be obtained without cost.

The court erred in ignoring

this poles-apart difference.
POINT V
THE CONTROLLING OPINION ERRED IN UPHOLDING AND ACCEPTING
COMPARABLES WHICH WERE NOT SIMILAR IN CHARACTER, LOCATION
AND OTHER FACTORS.
The case of State Road Commission vs.

Larken, 27

Utah 2d 295, 495 P2d 817 (1972), states as follows:
... ~</hether evidence of the value of other
property should be admitted depends on whether
they are sufficiently similar in character,
location and other factors which influence ~~e
value that they meet the test of reasonaole~
comparability so they can reasonably be regaLded
as having probative value as to the worth of
the property in question. Because of the
responsibility of the trial judge as the
authority in charge of the trial, he is allowed
considerable latitude in his judgment upon
the matter; and his ruling should not be disturbed
unless it appears he was clearly in error, and
that this redownded to the prejudice of the complaining party.
(Emphasis added) (27 Utah 2d 299,
quoting from State Road Commission vs. \qood,
22 Utah 2d 317, 320; 452 P2d 872 (1969))
The controlling opinion erred as did the court below in
accepting the properties used by defendant-respondent
parables which were similar

as com-

in character, location and other

factors as the property condemned in this case.

The water rights

recited as being comparable by the defendant, located in Heber
Valley, Corrinne, and Weber County, could not be replaced and
similar
rights
obtained
mereof Museum
application
to
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the State Engineer.

That is, NO OTHER WA'rER

surface nor underground, for appropriation in
fore, the water rights had great value.

\'I!•S

AVAILABLE, neither

those areas.

There-

Two of these water rights

were surface water rights and not well water rights.

Neverthe-

less, these three water rights had great value strictly because
of their scarcity and the inability of anyone else to obtain
similar water rights without buying them from the owner of the rights.
In the case at bar, the defendant has water rights which
allow removal of underground water by drilling in an area open
to drilling by anyone who applies to the

State Engineer for the

same type of water rights which include the right to drill (R 320).
Therefore, on this basis alone the three comparable sales cited
by the defendant are totally dissimilar.

In fact the three

comparables are directly opposite to the situation of the water
rights owned by the defendant.

If such comparable rights were

to be obtained at all, they could only be obtained by purchasing
the rights from someone who owned them.

In the defendant's case,

such rights were readily available merely by application to the
State Engineer and without cost.
In this case then, the location

of the comparable

sales is critical because of the location of the aquifer basin
in which the water rights are held.

They are totally different

from the water rights of the defendant and it was error for the
lower court to allow such to be considered by the jury, and to
be considered as controlling by this court.
There are other points of dissimilarity but I will only
mention
oneby other.
The
comparables
were
of
water
ricJhts
Sponsored
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only, not

~~lcs

of alleged specialty water, as contended by

defendant, in connection

with the

condemnation of

a going

business.

CONCLUSION
The defendant-respondent should not be given an
undeserved windfall of $50,000, plus interest, for water rights
which were and are still worthless.

This is what

defendant-

respondent will receive if the controlling opinion remains
unchanged.
Respectfully submitted,
ROGER F. CUTLER
City Attorney
RAY L. MONTGOMERY
Assistant City Attorney
101 City & Coc~ty Building
Salt Lal:e C: t:', 'Jtah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
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